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Abstract
In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information
and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual
decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process
decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in
their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type
composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An
indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows
that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary
process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous
studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only
cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than
being chosen strategically.
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I. Introduction
In standard rational choice modelling, decision makers decide completely
opportunistically in view of the anticipated causal consequences of each of
their decisions taken separately. In standard models of evolutionary game
theory, choices are treated as if being determined by a program or a
disposition specifying how to choose in each of a whole class of decision
situations. Though models that focus on either of the two extremes have
provided valuable insights, in the real world human decision making is
located somewhere between the extremes on which standard models focus. It
is influenced by the expected future as well as by the experienced past.
Therefore in our efforts to model and understand social behavior we should
not confine ourselves to isolating one of these factors by abstracting away the
other one but rather try to reach the middleground between the traditional
extreme modelling assumptions. We feel that an indirect evolutionary
approach is particularly well suited for this task.
Our subsequent discussion of the co-evolution of preferences and information
in a simple game of trust shall integrate „expectational pull“ and „adaptive
push“ in a single model. In previous indirect evolutionary analyses of trust
problems (see Güth and Kliemt 1995, Brennan et. al. 1997) we focused on the
evolution of preferences while assuming that players could strategically
decide about the acquisition of costly information. As opposed to that we
shall now treat the emergence of information conditions in basic trust
situations as endogenous to the evolutionary process. More specifically, in
section II we lay out our basic trust game and the background idea of the
indirect evolutionary approach. In section III we consider two extreme
information conditions and solve the basic games for both. In the one of the
two polar extremes players who must decide on whether to trust or not to
trust are completely uninformed about their co-player's type. In the other
polar case they are completely informed in that regard. In the next section, IV,
3it is described how players’ preferences to behave trustworthy and their
ability to detect that disposition in others may evolve in a co-evolutionary
process. Players are either completely informed I-types whose detection
technology truthfully reveals their co-player’s type with complete reliability
at cost C or they are totally uninformed U-types whose detection technology
is costless but so unreliable that they are left completely in the dark about
their co-player’s type. Section V scrutinizes whether under the extreme
information conditions associated with different player types there are any
population compositions which are dynamically stable along both the
preference and the information dimension. Section VI generalizes the
argument to the intermediate case in which a 'C, µ'-information technology
providing merely a stochastic signal about the co-player's type is available at
cost C>0. Section VII puts our results into perspective and relates them to
other approaches as pursued either by ourselves or others.
II. The trust predicament
Due to the fact that human decision makers are endowed with the
distinctively human faculty to make opportunistically rational choices social
interaction is soaked with problems of trust. Mutually advantageous forms of
co-operation may be closed off since they require that one partner move first
without a guarantee that the other(s) will reciprocate. Thus the "trust
predicament" emerges.
The essentials of interaction situations that can give rise to problems of trust
are represented in the first figure.
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Figure 1
The tree of figure 1 should not be mis-interpreted as a game in the proper
sense of that term. The starred entries at the ends of the branches of the tree
are not pay offs representing subjective preferences. They rather represent
objective or material rewards as measured for instance in monetary or other
units including such possibilities as increases in the number of offspring.
For individuals whose preferences can be represented by a pay off function
which in fact coincides with the material pay offs -- whose preferences are
"linear in money" -- the objective situation of figure 1 is transformed into a
game of trust by simply dropping the "stars". In that game, under the
conventional background assumption of common knowledge of the tree,
rational choice dictates that the first mover choose N since he foresees that the
second mover rationally chooses E. Both players end up with s in terms of
their subjective evaluations and with s* in objective terms while they could
have realized r>s or r*>s* respectively. The Pareto superior result is closed
off.
There are several conceivable „solutions“ for problems of trust (see for fine
overviews over social situations involving problems of trust Fukuyama 1995,
Landa 1994, Seligmann 1997). The institutions of promise and contract form a
case in point. These institutions confer commitment power on individuals
(see on the fundamental role of power conferring rules the seminal analysis in
5Hart 1961). Being endowed with commitment power individuals can choose
to modify their expected future pay offs in a preceding strategic move. To put
it slightly otherwise, by their preceding (contractual) promise individuals can
render themselves „trustworthy“ or – more formally speaking – choose to
play a modified subgame.
Institutional solutions to trust problems are what rational choice theorists
would focus on naturally. Other social theorists have traditionally drawn
attention to the "internalization of norms". Such an internalization gives rise
to a modification of preferences as well, however, without a preceding
strategic choice of the affected individual. We feel that rational choice
theorists rather than rejecting the "internalization of norms" out of hand as
obscure or ad hoc better should seek ways to integrate it in their models.
Besides extrinisic motivation which rests on the subjective perceptions of the
objective reward structure of an action situation intrinsic motivation which
derives from other sources like norm internalization can be a central element
of decision making (see in an economic vein on intrinsic motivation Frey
1997).
In the following figure a purely subjective motivational component not based
directly on objective rewards shows up as the pay off component "m".
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6Wheeling in such a motivational factor like m would be purely ad hoc if we
would let it rest with that. But we shall treat m as an endogenous parameter
of our model. In doing so we distinguish two player types, the trustworthy m-
type for whom in the role of the second mover due to m+1 < r (m<r-1<0) the
choice of R is rational and the untrustworthy m¯ -type for whom because of m¯
+1 > r (m¯ >r-1) the choice of E is rational. Since all values of m that fulfill the
same of the preceding inequalities are behaviorally equivalent it suffices to
focus on two types. Accordingly in our discussion of the evolution of the
population's type composition each of the two types represents a whole
interval of behaviorally equivalent values of m.
In previous work we considered how type dependent differences between the
trustworthy and untrustworthy types' decision making would bring about
differential evolutionary success -- as measured along the objective
dimension of material reward. We studied the evolution of the composition of
a population of trustworthy and untrustworthy types under various
parameter constellations and modelling assumptions. But we focused
exclusively on the evolution of preferences. With respect to information we
relied on the assumption that players could choose strategically whether or
not to acquire information of reliability µ at some cost C. Now we assume that
informed I-type players who are endowed with a 'C, µ'-technology emerge in
the evolutionary process and survive if they are more successful than the
uninformed U-type players who do not incur the cost but remain totally
uninformed about their co-player's type.
III. Basic games of trust and their solution
III.1. Basic games of trust as played by the uninformed and the informed
Imagine a game of trust as described in figure 2. Assume further that the
game is played by U-type players who do not know their co-player's
preference parameter m or, as we shall also say, they are ignorant of their co-
7player´s „moral“ type. Assignment of moral types can be modelled in the
conventional way as the outcome of a fictitious random move in which
"nature" or "player 0" chooses the types of the players. Since only the
trustworthiness of the second mover affects the outcome of the game we can
neglect the „moral“ type of the player who ends up in the first mover role. We
need to model only the type assignment for the second mover role.
In our model "nature" or "player 0" starts by assigning first and second mover
roles to players 1 and 2, respectively, in a random move with an equal
likelihood of 1/2 for either of the two roles. With probability q, corresponding
to the share q of trustworthy m-types in the population, player 0 „chooses“ in
the previously mentioned fictitious random move that the second mover be a
trustworthy m-type. Afterwards the game of trust of figure 2 is played
according to type and role assignment as fixed in the preceding random
moves. The following tree emerges:
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8As indicated above this tree models the game among U-type players. When
assigned the first mover role their detection technology does not reveal any
information on the type of the second mover. However, if there exist I-type
individuals then these types in the role of the first mover -- due to their
perfect detection technology -- have complete information on the second
mover’s type. With an I-type as player 1 and a U-type as player 2 the game is
characterized by the following graph
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As for the other assigments of information types: If only player 2 is an
informed type her information sets become singletons, while player 1 cannot
discriminate. If both players are informed then all information sets are
singletons.
9III.2 Solutions of trust games played by different informational and moral
types
Assume that the population share of I-types is p∈ [0, 1] while that of U-types
is 1-p. Assume further that the population share q of trustworthy m-types and
the complementary share 1-q of untrustworthy m¯ -types is common
knowledge among the players. Looking at the game recursively let us start
with the behavior in the role of the second mover. Obviously, for behavior in
second mover roles the informational type does not matter. Only the „moral“
type of being trustworthy or untrustworthy is then relevant: in second mover
roles trustworthy m-types will choose R while untrustworthy m¯ -types
choose E.
On the other hand, in the first mover role the moral type of the decision
maker is behaviorally irrelevant. But choosers of different informational types
tend to choose differently in first mover roles. The uninformed U-type, who
does not have access to specific type information and therefore must rely on
the prior probability q of meeting a trustworthy second mover will choose to
trust if q*r + (1-q)*0>s – i.e. q>s/r – and not to trust if q*r + (1-q)*0<s – i.e.
q<s/r (as shall become obvious subsequently the degenerate case q=s/r can
be neglected for the purposes at hand). The decisions of the fully informed I-
type will, however, be determined completely by his knowledge of the second
mover´s type: if the second mover is a trustworthy m-type an I-type first
mover, expecting r rather than s, chooses T; if the second mover is an
untrustworthy m¯ -type the I-type first mover, expecting s rather than 0,
decides on N.
In principle we would have to consider four combinations of informational
and moral aspects and thus four player types: m-I-types, m-U-types, m¯ -I-
types, m¯ -U-types. However, since in first mover roles players independently
of their own moral type choose according to their informational type while in
second mover roles moral type is all that matters the moral and informational
dimensions of the problem are „separable“. It suffices in the subsequent
discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of the population composition to
consider the relative survival prospects of U- vs. I-types independently of
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their own moral type while the relative success of the m- vs m¯ -types does not
depend on their informational type.
IV. Evolutionary dynamics
Let us now investigate how p and q will evolve if the preceding games are
played among randomly paired players chosen from an infinite population of
individuals of the four „moral cum informational“ types. Our basic
assumption is that q increases (decreases) when the m-types are more (less)
successful than m¯ -types in basic games. Similarly, p is assumed to increase
(decrease) whenever I-types are more (less) successful than U-types.
Since we assume that players are randomly drawn from a population
containing infinitely many individuals of all types the average expected
success of different types will have 0-variance, i.e. each types´ average success
is not stochastic while that of the individuals belonging to the different types
may well be. In view of this we can directly relate the decrease and increase in
population shares p and q to expected pay offs and these in turn to their
objective („starred“) counterparts – the „currency“ in which relative success
in evolutionary competition is ultimately determined.
Now, starting with relative success of informational types, consider the
expectations of an I-type as opposed to those of a U-type. For the sake of
specificity assume, initially, that the situation sketched in figure 4 obtains.
Player 1 is an I-type and player 2 a U-type. Player 1 has incurred a sunk cost
of C. Whether or not this makes him better off than a U-type player 1 depends
on the value of the information to which he gains access. So let us look at the
value of the information.
With a probability of ½ player 1 expects to play as a first and with equal
likelihood as a second mover. Before matching and before role assignment
player 1´s expectations for the contingency of becoming the first mover
depend solely on the population composition parameter q. This parameter
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describes how likely it is that he be paired with a trustworthy co-player
whom he then would recognize since as an I-type first mover player 1 can
perfectly discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy second
movers. Thus before matching and role assignment I-type player 1 expects
½[qr + (1-q)s] from the first mover role. As compared to that a U-type player 1
would expect ½[qr+(1-q)0], for q>s/r, and ½s, for q<s/r.
When assigned the second mover role I-type player 1´s information about
first moving player 2´s type is strategically irrelevant. The I-type like the U-
type second mover plays solely according to his own moral type. In the case
described in figure 4 both types of player 1 are dealing with an uninformed
player 2 in the first mover role. Behavior of such a U-type player depends
solely on the relation between q and s/r. Thus under the information
conditions depicted in figure 4 I-type and U-type players of identical moral
type have identical expectations in second mover roles.
It is obvious that the preceding line of argument applies to all combinations
of types assigned to player 1 and 2: I-type and U-type players of identical
moral type have identical expectations in second mover roles as determined
by their co-player´s informational type (and, of course, independently of the
first moving co-player´s moral type).
If the identical expectations of I-types and U-types in second mover roles are
W then before role assignment and matching the expectation of both
informationally different but morally identical types of player 1 are ½W. The
same term ½W forms part of the expectation RI(q) of the informed I-type and
of the expectation RU(q) of the uninformed U-type. Therefore the pay off in
second mover roles cannot differentiate between morally identical types that
differ only along the informational dimension. Pay off in second mover roles
can therefore be neglected in the determination of relative evolutionary
success of morally identical alternative informational types.
Taking into account this observation we can focus solely on differential
success of alternative informational types in first mover roles. Moreover,
since we are dealing with an infinite population in which expectations
12
directly translate into relative success of different types we get – after
multiplying with 2 -- the following simplified success functions for I-types
and U-types:
(IV.1) RI(q) = qr + (1-q)s - 2C
(IV.2) RU(q) =
s        for q < s / r
qr      for q > s / r
⎧⎨⎩ .
For RI(q) > RU(q) to be fulfilled it is necessary that
(IV.3) 2C
s
r
r s< −( )
and
(IV.4)
2 2C
r s
q s C
s−
< <
−
apply. The left hand side of IV.4 emerges for s/r>q and the right hand side for
s/r<q. If the interval for q characterized by IV.4 is non-empty this in turn
implies that IV.3 obtains as well. Moreover, if IV.4 holds good and thus the
necessary condition, IV.3, for a non-empty interval applies as well then q=s/r
will always be an element of that non-empty interval.
The negation of IV.3 is 2C s
r
r s≥ −( ) . If 2C is strictly greater than the right hand
side of the inequality there are no populations of trustworthy and
untrustworthy types such that the informed would do better than the
uninformed type. Due to the high „fixed cost“ of being an informed type
eventually I-types are driven out of the population. In the degenerate case in
which IV.3 becomes an equality with an empty interval IV.4 the population
share p of informed individuals will almost always decline too.
Up to now we relied on the sign of RI(q)-RU(q) as indicating the direction of
change. We have for all t≥ 0
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(IV.5) RI(qt)-RU(qt) =
(r - s)q - 2C        for q < s / r
 s - 2C - sq           for q > s / r
t t
t t
⎧⎨⎩  .
Clearly, under any plausible specification of the dynamic process, as long as
RI(qt)-RU(qt)>0, pt should increase through time.
To say anything about the dynamic the process itself we need to specify it. So
let us postulate that the dynamic process can be described by a linear
relationship
(IV.6)  pt = k [RI(qt)-RU(qt)]
where k is a positive constant.
Turning to the dynamics of q let us assume initially that IV.3 obtains and  that
there is a permanent influx (mutation) of I-types such that there are always
some informed individuals around. Thus, even if pt → 0 for t→ ∞  the
population share pt of informed I-types is always positive.
In second mover roles differential success of moral types depends on the
population share p of informed types in first mover roles. For an m-type
second mover we therefore get
(IV.7) Rm(p) =
pr +  (1- p)s         for q < s / r
r                            for q > s / r
⎧⎨⎩
and for an m¯ -type
(IV.8) R m (p) =
s                           for   q < s / r
ps +  (1 p) 1     for   q > s / r−
⎧⎨⎩  .
Rm(p) -R m (p)>0 is fulfilled for q<s/r since, by assumption p>0 and r>s.
Therefore for q<s/r and p>0 the share q of m-types increases while for q>s/r
(IV.9)    p > 
1
1
−
−
r
s
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is required for that to be the case. Thus an increase of q is to be expected
unless q>s/r and IV.9 is reversed. In the latter case Rm(p) -R m (p)<0 and q will
decrease.
Again, in view of the difference
(IV.10) Rm(p) -R m (p)= 
(r - s)p                 for q < s / r
(1- s)p  -  (1 - r)   for q > s / r
t t
t t
⎧⎨⎩
we specify the dynamic process by postulating the linear relationship
(IV.11)  qt = h [Rm(pt) -R m (pt)]
where h is a positive constant.
If the reverse of relation IV.3 applies we know from the preceding argument
about the dynamics of p that the informed I-types will tend to be driven out
of the population entirely. However, if one assumes -- as we did above and
shall do after the following brief digression -- that there is a permanent influx
of I-types such that pt>0 then pt=0 is merely a limit result. Still it may be noted
that pt=0 corresponds to a generic case, if the type revealing signal that is
received in first mover roles becomes stochastic. Therefore it seems
appropriate to look at the limiting constellation somewhat more carefully
rather than to dismiss it out of hand.
Suspending the assumption pt>0 let us for the time being and for the sake of
simplicity suppose that I-types have been driven out completely and
therefore all players are uninformed U-types. Though all are U-types some
may be trustworthy and others untrustworthy. However, since all are
uninformed the game of figure 3 is played throughout. Now, it is obvious that
in the game as displayed in figure 3 untrustworthy second movers –
regardless of their informational characteristics in first mover roles and the
costs they would incur then – have an advantage over trustworthy ones if
they find a trusting first mover. In first mover roles uninformed first movers
regardless of their own moral type will rationally choose to trust as long as
q>s/r. Thus in that realm in a population of uninformed U-types the
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population share q of the trustworthy will decline. On the other hand, since in
case q<s/r first movers should rationally choose N throughout nothing could
differentiate between types leaving the population composition unaltered.
Therefore all (p, q) with p=0 and q<s/r would be rest points, though with
degenerate attraction sets.
Assuming that decision makers even though they are rational are prone to
commit occasional mistakes uninformed first movers would once in a while
mistakenly choose to trust even if q<s/r. Then the untrustworthy could have
an advantage over the trustworthy types beyond the threshold of q=s/r and
the population share q of trustworthy individuals would tend to decline over
the whole interval (0, 1] – though the decline would be slowed down for
q<s/r.
The next figures sum up the preceding discussion of the dynamics of p and of
q.
q
1
0
0 1
(s-2C)/s
2C/(r-s)
p
s/r
  
q
1-r
1-s
p
s/r
The direction in which p and q change for 2C s
r
r s< −( )
Figure 5 a,b
16
The p,q-dynamics for 2C s
r
r s< −( )
Figure 6
V. Stability of p,q-constellations
A rest point (p*, q*) of the p,q-dynamics is characterized by vanishing rates of
change  pt  and  qt :
(V.1) (  pt ,  qt ) =  (k [RI(q*)-RU(q*)], h [Rm(p*) -R m (p*)] )= (0, 0).
Since pt>0 and qt<s/r imply  qt >0 there are no restpoints
(V.2) (p, q)∈[0, 1]2  with q<s/r and p>0.
q
1
s/r
0
0 11-r1-s
(s-2C)/s
2C/(r-s)
p
17
Therefore in the range q<s/r only the points from the line segment [p=0, q ≤
s/r) or – in case of trembles – possibly the point (p, q)=(0, 0) can be rest points
(with degenerate attraction sets). In the degenerate case q=s/r the first
moving player is indifferent between N and T. There is no unique solution
play for the first moving player. Since changes in the population composition
depend on play and since the first-mover’s play cannot be predicted (  pt ,  qt ) is
not determined. Hardly anything can be said about this case.
Other p,q-constellations can be at rest only if they are an element of
(V.3) E:={(p, q) )∈[0, 1]2 | q>s/r}
Moreover, if (p, q)∈E and thus q>s/r, then p>
1
1
−
−
r
s
 implies Rm(p)-R m (p)>0
and p<
1
1
−
−
r
s
implies Rm(p) -R m (p)<0 (see figures 5 and 6). From this
consideration it is already obvious that rest points in E must fulfil p=
1
1
−
−
r
s
.
Analogous arguments show that it is necessary for a rest point that q=
s C
s
− 2
be fulfilled, too. Thus there can only be one point that fulfils both necessary
conditions. Since together the two conditions imply vanishing rates of change
along both dimensions the unique rest point in E is
(V.4) (p*, q*)=(
1
1
−
−
r
s
, 
s C
s
− 2
) .
In the rest point (p*, q*) the rates of change  pt ,  qt  vanish. Intuitively speaking
there is no „push away“ from (p*, q*) since for sufficiently small
perturbations the dynamic process will remain arbitrarily close to that state.
More formally, (p*, q*) is stable in the sense that for every ε >0 and the
corresponding neighborhood under the Euclidean norm d(.,.) there is a δ >0
and a corresponding neighborhood of (p*, q*) such that for a „starting point“
(p0, q0) with d((p*, q*), (p0, q0))<δ  we have d((p*, q*), (pt, qt))<ε  for all t≥ 0.
Though stable the point (p*, q*) is, however, not (locally) asymptotically
stable. To be (locally) asymptotically stable there must not only be no „push
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away“ from (p*, q*) but rather some „pull towards“ it. More formally, (p*, q*)
is not (locally) asymptotically stable, since there exists no ε >0 such that for all
starting points (p0, q0) with d((p*, q*), (p0, q0))< ε  we have limt→∞  (pt, qt)=(p*, q*). –
These claims are demonstrated in the subsequent discussion of the time path
of (pt, qt), t≥ 0, for all initial (p0, q0).
For (pt, qt)∈E we have qt>s/r. Inserting IV.5 into IV.6 and IV.10 into IV.11
yields
(V.5)  pt = k [s-2C-s qt], k>0
(V.6)  qt  = h [(1-s) pt-(1-r)], h>0.
Solving V.5 for qt and taking the derivative with respect to time yields
(V.7)  qt =-
1
ks
  pt
and, using V.7 on V.6
(V.8)   pt + khs (1-s) pt = khs (1-r).
A constant solution to the inhomogeneous differential equation V.8 is
(V.9) pt=c, where c=
1
1
−
−
r
s
.
For the homogeneous equation
(V.10)   pt + b
2 pt = 0 with b
2=khs (1-s)
two independent solutions are given by
(V.11) pt=sin(tb)  and pt=cos(tb).
All solutions can be expressed as
(V.12) pt= c + λ 1 sin(tb) + λ 2 cos(tb), for some λ 1 ,λ 2 ∈ R.
Taking the derivative
(V.13)  pt = λ 1 b cos(tb) - λ 2 b sin(tb),
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using it on V.5 and solving for qt we have
(V.14) qt =
s C
s
− 2
+ 
b
ks  [ λ 2  sin(tb) - λ 1  cos(tb)].
From V.13 and V.14 it is obvious that the pt,qt-dynamics are periodic since sin
and cos are periodic. Regardless of the two positive factors k and h any initial
pt,qt-constellation will be revisited indefinitely. Moreover, from any initial (pt,
qt) ≠ (p*, q*) with qt>s/r the dynamic process will not be attracted to the
unique rest point (p*, q*)=(
1
1
−
−
r
s
, 
s C
s
− 2
) in E. The attraction set of (p*, q*) is
{(p*, q*)}.
In view of general mathematical insights into the structure of (time)
continuous processes in R2 this result is hardly surprising. A process starting
at some (p, q)∈E must either converge to some (p*, q*) or be periodic. In our
case periodicity ensues because linearity and, for that matter, „separability“
prevent convergence.
The preceding considerations rule out any stronger statements about
attractors of the dynamic process. We can, however, characterize the periodic
process somewhat further. In doing so let us first define two other auxiliary
constants
 d:= ks
b
and e:=k s C
b
− 2  .
Using these constants we can rewrite (V.12) and (V.14) as
(V.12´) pt - c = λ 1 sin(tb) + λ 2 cos(tb)
(V.14´) d qt - e = λ 2  sin(tb) - λ 1  cos(tb).
After multiplying the first equation by λ 2 , the second by λ 1  and substracting
the results we get
(V.15) cos(bt) = 
λ λ
λ λ
2 1
1
2
2
2
( ) ( )p c dq et t− − −
+
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whereas multiplying the first equation by λ 1 , the second by λ 2  and adding
the results yields
(V.16) sin(bt) = 
λ λ
λ λ
1 2
1
2
2
2
( ) ( )p c dq et t− + −
+  .
Using cos2(bt)+sin2(bt)=1 we get
[λ 2 (pt - c) - λ 1 (dqt-e)]
 2 + [λ 1 (pt - c)+ λ 2 (dqt-e)]
 2 = [λ 12 +λ 22 ]
 2
and from this
(V.17) (pt - c)
 2+ (dqt-e)
2 = λ 12 +λ 22 .
The pt,qt-process cycles on an ellipse around the unique rest point in E,
namely (p*, q*)=(
1
1
−
−
r
s
, 
s C
s
− 2
)=(c, e/d). The time span for a complete
cycle, ∆t , can be calculated by considering pt= pt t+∆ in equation (V.12´); that is
(V.18) λ 1 sin(tb) + λ 2 cos(tb) = λ 1 sin([t+ ∆t ]b) + λ 2 cos([t+ ∆t ]b).
Due to the periodicity 2π  of sin as well as of cos we can conclude that 2π = ∆t b
and thus
(V.19) ∆t  = 2π /b = 2
1
π
khs s( )−
.
The two parameters k and h allow for different volatilities of the adaptive
processes along the informational or p-dimension and the moral or q-
dimension of the population composition. The length of the „cycle“ of the
dynamic process in which the population composition changes through time
is determined as a function of the product khs(1-s): the larger the factor kh the
shorter the cycle. Analogously, the larger the factor s(1-s), i.e. the closer s is to
1/2 the shorter the cycle.
Finally, for all k, h and any starting point (p0, q0)∈E the coefficients are
uniquely determined by equations V.12´ and V.14´ as
(V.20) p0 – c = λ 2
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(V.21) dq0-e = -λ 1 ;
where c is a function of the exogenous parameters r, s, while b and d are
functions of k, h and again the exogenous parameter s. For all k, h and all (p0,
q0)∈E the time trajectories of the pt, qt-process can be determined. As V.17
shows this process stays on the same graph while its cycle length depends on
kh and s(1-s). For all t>0 we have:
(V.12´´) pt – c  = (e - dq0) sin(bt) + (p0 – c) cos(bt)
(V.14´´) dqt - e = (p0 – c) sin(bt) + (dq0 – e) cos(bt) .
VI. Imperfect type detection
The preceding discussion focused on polar extremes. Either U-types were
assigned first mover roles and a game with purely private information on the
second mover´s moral type was played or I-types playing in the first mover
role could perfectly discriminate between the trustworthy and untrustworthy
second movers. Obviously the middle ground between these extremes is of
great interest. In situations involving problems of trust the information status
of real world decision makers more often than not seems neither to
correspond to that of fully informed I-types nor to that of completely ignorant
U-types. It seems quite realistic that real world decision makers command
what we shall call a `C, µ´-technology. This information `technology´ -- using
the term `technology´ in its widest sense including long acquaintance,
detective services, other individuals´ looks etc. – provides some information
of the second mover´s type. More specifically, partially informed I´-type
individuals have access to a stochastic signal which reveals the co-player´s
type with probability µ>1/2. Gaining access they incur, however, some sunk
cost C>0.
If the second mover is a trustworthy m-type then an imperfectly informed
first mover receives with probabilty µ  the signal ' m '. With probability (1- µ )
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the signal received at cost C>0 from an m-type is ’m ’. If the second mover is
an m¯ -type then with probability µ  the true type is revealed by the signal ' m '
while with complementary probability 1- µ  the signal ' m ' misleadingly
indicates a trustworthy type even though it is received from an
untrustworthy m¯ -type.
We require
(V.I) ½ < µ , µ  ≤  1.
Knowing the population share q of trustworthy m-types in the population, all
players should rationally endorse the prior probability q of encountering a
trustworthy second mover. Beyond this, U-type players do not command
information about their second moving co-player´s moral type. But
(incompletely) informed I´-type players in first mover roles receive a type
signal indicating with probability µ= µ , µ  their second moving co-player´s
true type. Obviously the probability of receiving the signal ' m ' is q µ  + (1-q)(1-
µ ) so that the posterior probability for a trustworthy m-type individual in the
second mover role after receiving the signal ' m ' is q µ /[q µ  + (1-q)(1- µ )].
Analogously, the probability of receiving the signal 'm ' is q(1- µ ) + (1-q) µ .
After receiving the signal ' m ' the posterior probability for an untrustworthy
m¯ -type in the second mover role is (1-q) µ /[q(1- µ ) + (1-q) µ ] while after that
signal the posterior probability for a trustworthy m-type is q(1- µ )/[q(1- µ ) +
(1-q) µ ].
After receiving signal ' m ' an imperfectly informed I´-type should rationally
prefer to trust, T, over showing no trust, N, in the role of the first mover if
(VI.2)
qµ
µ µq q+ − −( )( )1 1 r > s;
while after receiving the signal ' m ' he should rationally prefer N over T if
(VI.3)
q(1- µ
µ µ
)
( ) ( )q q1 1− + − r < s.
For convenience set
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(VI.4) R:=
qµ
µ µq q+ − −( )( )1 1 , L:=
q(1- µ
µ µ
)
( ) ( )q q1 1− + − .
Observe that 1>q>0 and ½ < µ , µ  < 1 imply
(VI.5) 1>R>L>0.
I´-type players will follow the signal ' m ' by choosing T only if R> s
r
 and they
will follow the signal ' m ' by choosing N only if L< s
r
. Thus I´-type players will
follow both signals only if
(VI.6) s
r
∈ (L, R).
Now, note that the relation R> s
r
 is equivalent to
(VI.2´) q > s(1- µ
µ µ
)
( ) ( )r s s− + −1
while relation L< s
r
 is equivalent to
(VI.3´) q < sµ
µ µ( )( )1− − +r s s .
Set
(VI.7) J:= s(1- µ
µ µ
)
( ) ( )r s s− + −1 and H:= 
sµ
µ µ( )( )1− − +r s s .
The assumption ½ < µ , µ  implies
(VI.5´)    0<J<H<1.
Observe also that s
r
<R⇔ q>J and L< s
r
⇔ q<H and thus
(VI.8) s
r
∈ (L, R) ⇔ q∈ (J, H).
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Only for VI.8 can type differentiation take place. For, I´-type players should
be expected to behave exactly like U-type players whenever s
r
∉ (L, R) – i.e.,
s
r
≥ R or s
r
≤ L -- and thus also q∉(J, H) – i.e., q≤ J or H≤ q. To see this, assume
first that the I´-type players ignore the signal ' m ' because of R ≤ s
r
. Note,
(R> s
r
⇔ q>J) ⇔  (q≤ J⇔ R≤ s
r
). Moreover ½ < µ , µ , implies (r-s)(1- µ )< µ (r-s)
and  (r-s)(1- µ )< µ (r-s) ⇔  J< s
r
. Therefore for R ≤ s
r
 we get s
r
>J≥ q. Because of
s
r
>q all U-type players should rationally choose not to trust in the first mover
role while the I´-types should not let the signal ' m ' induce them to deviate
from the strategy suggested by q< s
r
. Moreover, since R>L the I´-types should
follow the signal ' m ' and thus in that contingency should certainly behave
like the U-types, too. In sum, nothing can differentiate between I´-types and
U-types if s
r
≥ R.
Turning to the other conceivably violation of VI.8, assume secondly, s
r
≤ L.
Note s
r
≤ L⇔ H≤ q. Moreover, ½ < µ , µ  implies q≥ H⇔ q≥ s
r s s
( ) ( )1− − +µ
µ
. The
latter implies q> s
r s s( )− + = 
s
r
. Therefore all U-type players should choose T, if
s
r
≤ L. Note that s
r
≤ L is the negation of VI.3. It is therefore not the case that the
I´-type should choose N over T after receiving an 'm '-signal. He should rather
ignore that signal and decide on T. Should the I´-type receive an 'm '-signal he
should certainly choose to trust if s
r
≤ L<R. In sum, if s
r
≤ L nothing can
differentiate between U-types and I´-types.
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that for q∉(J, H) – or, for that
matter, s
r
∉(L, R) -- nothing can differentiate between uninformed U-types
and (incompletely) informed I´-types. If VI.8 is not fulfilled all types behave
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like U-types. Therefore the case s
r
∉(L, R) [q∉(J, H)] corresponds to that of p=0
for which we have shown elsewhere that – at least in the presence of
occasional mistakes -- there is a single universal attractor for q namely q=0
(see Güth and Kliemt 1994). For qt > H, of course, the dynamic process will
eventually yield qt ∈ (J, H) whereas qt < J the range will never be reached.
Since qt < J implies RU(q)>RI´(q) and thus a decrease of p, now the line segment
[p=0, J) or – in case of occasional mistakes – the rest point (p, q)=(0, 0) have a
generic attraction set, namely all (p, q), with q<J. The points (p, q)=(0, q) with
0<q<s/r remain rest points with degenerate attraction sets. – In our
remaining discussion of the case of incompletely informed I´-type players we
focus on qt ∈ (J, H).
Studying the dynamics of p and of q we must again consider the relative
reproductive success of I´- as compared to U-types and of m- as compared to
m¯ -types. The condition RI´(q)-RU(q)>0 now reads
(VI.9) {q[ µ r + (1- µ )s] + (1-q) [ µ s + (1- µ )0]-2C} - s>0 if q<s/r
⇔
(VI.9´) q > s(1- µ
µ µ
)
( ) ( )
+
− + −
2
1
C
r s s
.
Similarly,
(VI.10) {q[ µ r + (1- µ )s] + (1-q) [ µ s + (1- µ )0]-2C} - qr>0 if q>s/r
⇔
(VI.10´) q > sµ
µ µ
−
− − +
2
1
C
r s s( )( )  .
Again for notational convenience
(VI.11) U:= s(1- µ
µ µ
)
( ) ( )
+
− + −
2
1
C
r s s
and O:= sµ
µ µ
−
− − +
2
1
C
r s s( )( ) .
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For q∈(U, O) the population share p of I´-types should be expected to increase
whereas a decrease must be expected for q∉[U, O]. Due to C>0 we get
(VI.12) H > O > s
r
 > U > J
as long as
(VI.13) 2C < s
r
(r-s) ( µ  + µ  - 1).
This being said about the informational dimension let us now turn to the
moral dimension. As before we rely on p>0 when studying the case q<s/r.
Recall that moral type matters only in second mover roles. At the same time
differential success of moral types depends on the population share p of
informed types in first mover roles. Thus we get for an m-type second mover
(VI.14)  Rm(p) =
p( r + (1- )s) +  (1- p)s      for q < s / r
p( r + (1- )s) +  (1- p)r       for q > s / r
µ µ
µ µ
⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
and for an m¯ -type
(VI.15) R m (p) =
p( s + (1- )1) +  (1- p)s      for q < s / r
p( s + (1- )1) +  (1- p)1      for q > s / r
µ µ
µ µ
⎧⎨⎪
⎩⎪  .
Rm(p) -R m (p)>0 holds good for q>s/r if
(VI.16) p > 1
1 1
−
− + − −
r
s r sµ µ( ) ( )( ) .
Rm(p) -R m (p)>0 holds good for q<s/r if
(VI.17)
µ
µ1−
 > 1−
−
s
r s
.
Note that VI.16 emerges only for µ (1-s)>(r-s)(1- µ ) or 1−
−
s
r s
>
1− µ
µ
 otherwise the
relation would be reversed with a negative right hand side requiring a
negative p. The relations VI.16 and VI.17 can be fulfilled both only for
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parameter constellations with  1−
−
s
r s
∈ (
1− µ
µ
,
µ
µ1−
). Only then can the presence
of informed I´-types drive a population share qt<
s
r
 beyond the threshold
beyond which the uninformed U-types have good reason to trust always.
Rm(p) -R m (p)<0 applies if in case of q>s/r VI.16 is reversed. In particular this
will be always the case for 1−
−
s
r s
<
1− µ
µ
. For this parameter constellation growth
of the population share q of trustworthy individuals is possible only over the
range [0, s
r
). Of course, Rm(p) -R m (p)<0 also holds good if in case q<s/r
relation VI.17 is reversed to 
µ
µ1−
< 1−
−
s
r s
.
Again, after defining for convenience
(VI.18) M:= 1
1 1
−
− + − −
r
s r sµ µ( ) ( )( )
our considerations can be summed up graphically by figures 7 and 8. Note
that we restricted attention to parameter constellations statisfying 2C < s
r
(r-s)
( µ  + µ  - 1).
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excluded
excluded
qt
1
H
O
s/r
U
J
0
0 M 1
pt
Figure 7, VI.17
excluded
excluded
qt
1
H
O
s/r
U
J
0
0 M 1
pt
Figure 8, VI.17 reversed
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As a final step let us now turn to the dynamics in E={(p, q) )∈[0, 1]2 | q>s/r} if
this set contains a unique rest point. We assume that p>0 and 1−
−
s
r s
>
1− µ
µ
obtain. Due to q>s/r we can as before in the case of differential equations V.5
and V.6 restrict attention to two generalized differential equations:
(VI.19)  pt =k [RI´(q)-RU(q)] = k [{ µ (r-s)+(1- µ )s-r}qt + µ s –2C]
(VI.20)  qt =h [Rm(p) -R m (p)] = l [{ µ  (1-s)+(r-s) ( µ -1)}pt – 1 + r]
Making the same basic assumptions about the characteristics of the dynamic
process  pt again emerges as an (affin) linear function of qt and  qt as an (affin)
linear function of pt. Like in the extreme parameter constellation µ = µ =1 the
unique rest point
(VI.21) (p*, q*)=(M, O)=( sµ
µ µ
−
− − +
2
1
C
r s s( )( ) , 
1
1 1
−
− + − −
r
s r sµ µ( ) ( )( ) )
of E has merely the degenerate attraction set {(p*,q*)}. All other starting points
(p, q)∈E lead to indefinite cycling around the unique rest point (p*, q*). Thus
the central qualitative results of the deterministic case, characterized by
µ = µ =1, carry over to those cases in which the type signal is stochastic.
VII. Concluding remarks
The preceding exercise offers, on the one hand, some interesting insights into
methodological problems of rational choice modelling (in a wide sense of that
term) and, on the other hand, substantial results about trust relationships. To
start with the latter, it is intuitively plausible that the prospects of trustworthy
individuals as opposed to untrustworthy ones crucially depend on the
existence of individuals who can to some extent discriminate between
trustworthy and untrustworthy partners. In our model -- provided that the
conditions for following the signal are fulfilled -- the (costly) information on
individuals´ trustworthiness leads to a discrimination between types. If the
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signal indicates a trustworthy second mover this leads to a choice of T in first
mover roles even if q<s/r. If the signal received indicates an untrustworthy
type, N is chosen even if q>s/r. This corroborates the somewhat elementary
yet extremely important insight that the stability of co-operation in view of
the trust predicament depends at least as much on the presence of the faculty
and inclination to discriminate in the role of the trustor as on the disposition
to act fairly as a trustee.
In our model discrimination expresses itself – in the realm in which following
the signal is rational -- by signal-dependent choices of N and T. In social
reality it may express itself in somewhat different though related forms. In
particular, players may be able to choose their interaction partners and thus
to discriminate against the untrustworthy by refusing to interact with them in
the first place. Moreover, the free choice of partners could include both the
option of repeating interactions with the same partner and of ending them. If
that would be the case „the shadow of the future“ (Axelrod 1984) or „the
discipline of continuous dealings“ (Smith 1776/1976) might be operative as
well. The presence of this shadow would tend to diminish the value of type
discrimination by inducing trustworthy behavior by all types (on simulation
studies of the discipline of continuous dealings in the presence of an exit
option see for example Schüssler 1990, Vanberg and Congleton 1992 and on
inducing the untrustworthy to behave as if trustworthy, of course, Kreps and
Wilson 1982).
This being said and explicitly acknowledging that other factors may
discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals as well we
feel that it is of great importance to go beyond the intuitively plausible and to
gain a somewhat better understanding of the impact of alternative
information conditions on the relative survival prospects of trustworthy, non
opportunistic and untrustworthy, opportunistic individuals. That such a
closer look may yield quite surprising insights is borne out by comparing the
results of the present with our former applications of the indirect
evolutionary approach to trust problems.
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Formerly we have studied the influence of ´C, µ´-technologies of different
reliability on the population composition under the premise that the players
could choose strategically whether or not they would acquire specific type
information of reliability µ at cost C. Under this condition, depending on the
parameter constellation, either only p=0 or p=0 and p=p*>s/r would be
evolutionarily stable population compositions with attraction sets whose
union would comprise the whole interval [0, 1]. In the present model all the
basic assumptions are the same with the only exception that the information
technology now is not chosen but rather some players are endowed or, for
that matter, stuck with this costly technology without that being their own
choice. Under both assumptions, that of the strategic choice of the
information technology and that of its evolution, bi-morphic rest points or
evolutionarily stable population compositions that contain opportunistic as
well as non-opportunistic types may emerge. However, interestingly enough,
at least under very natural and simple assumptions about the dynamics of the
evolutionary process the effects on the population composition are
qualitatively very different from the case in which the costs of being informed
are subject to a strategic choice: in the model in which information evolves
along with preferences there need not be a generic attractor corresponding to
the stable bi-morphism in the model in which information conditions are
strategically chosen.
Relating this to our social experience it seems to suggest that the presence of
some „zealots“ who are for some reason or other very averse to being
exploited or are pre-occupied with knowing their partners´ true character can
have a fundamental impact on the character of social interaction (for a
somewhat parallel argument see Coleman 1983). To put it very bluntly
„nosiness“ may not be such a bad thing altogether. We might even represent
it by an intrinsic motivational factor expressing a zealous preference for
defending oneself against exploitation even at high extrinsic or objective costs
C. Such inclinations may lead to building up the population share of
trustworthy individuals in situations where nobody would rationally invest
in costly information technologies. For, informed individuals will seek out the
trustworthy in situations in which the population share of the trustworthy is
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too low for rendering the choice of T rational. Due to this the trustworthy will
have a slight differential advantage over the untrustworthy unless this effect
is overcompensated by mistaken choices of T that are made without a signal
or due to a misleading one.
In fact, even in our former model in which players made a strategic decision
about acquiring the information technology the same kind of argument may
apply. As long as individuals once in a while invest in a ´C, µ´ technology
even though it is not rational to do so this – without any zealotry -- may be
sufficient to secure to the trustworthy an advantage over the untrustworthy.
In the presence of such mistaken investments in information pt>0 will be
fulfilled throughout. Again, once in a while trustworthy second movers will
be singled out and will be trusted in an environment in which there are too
few trustworthy to show trust generally. Like in the presence of zealots this
will bring about a differential advantage for the trustworthy if it is not
overcompensated by mistaken choices of T among those who do not
command specific type information. The latter may seem a big if, though, if
one takes into account how mistakes of different kinds may compensate each
other.
Avoiding a formal analysis of mistake driven evolutionary processes here let
us only remark that in those cases in which pt>0 is sufficiently large to
provide a differential advantage for the trustworthy over the untrustworthy a
self-supporting process of the following kind may be operative: Initially there
are too few trustworthy around to make seeking them out worthwhile. But
after a while that may change and the informed may have an advantage over
the uninformed and thus their population share might increase as well.
Of course, as our model shows, after going beyond a certain threshold the
decrease of trustworthy individuals – and for that matter also of informed
individuals – will eventually be unavoidable. Still, there might be some
institutional means or other to stabilize population shares p of trustworthy
individuals once they have grown beyond a certain threshold. This seems to
be quite interesting from a policy point of view, too. Admitedly it is
speculative, though not completely so since within the framework of our
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indirect evolutionary approach to the trust predicament it can be shown that
the proper workings of a court system depend on the presence of sufficiently
many non-opportunistic individuals if adjudicators cannot be selected
according to their trustworthiness and thus „judges are no better than the rest
of us“ (see Brennan, Güth, and Kliemt 1997).
Letting our discussion of substantial issues rest with this we may finally turn
to some methodological problems. Since we have touched on these issues
already in our preceding discussion of the substantial trust problem we can
be quite brief. We feel that our models suggest to explore more carefully what
may be regarded as varying „degrees of indirectness“ in the evolutionary
approach. Evolutionary models might reach from the extreme of a completely
indirect evolutionary approach in which even the faculty to make
opportunistically rational choices itself is viewed as endogenous to or
emergent from an evolutionary process (see Güth and Kliemt 1998), over the
still extreme more standard direct evolutionary approach in which all
behavior evolves without opportunistically rational choices playing a role, to
models in which some decisions are modelled as opportunistically rational in
the standard sense while the information conditions evolve along with some
aspects of preferences, to models in which some information conditions as
well as the substantial decisions are subject to opportunistically rational
choice while certain aspects of the preferences are emergent, to extreme
models in which even the utility function for some game can be chosen
strategically (though one may have some second thoughts about that claim as
for instance made in Frank 1987). Observing that there is almost a continuum
of models of varying degrees of indirectness it seems clear that further
research should look at the pros and cons of alternative degrees of
indirectness. Doing this we may hope to gain not only additional
methodological but also some new insights into such eternal problems like
that of „nature and nurture“.
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